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On February 24-25, 2006 an international workshop on “Regional and 
International Currency Arrangements” was held in Vienna. It was co-sponsored 
by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bank of Greece, and jointly 
organized by Eduard Hochreiter and George Tavlas. Academic economists and 
researchers from central banks and international organizations presented and 
discussed current research, and reviewed and assessed the past experience with, 
and the future challenges of, international currency arrangements. A number of 
papers and the contributions by the discussants presented at this workshop are 
being made available to a broader audience in the Working Paper series of the 
Bank of Greece and simultaneously also in the Working Paper Series of the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The papers and the discussants’ comments will 
be published in the journal, International Economics and Economic Policy. 
Here we present the third of these papers. (The previous two were issued as 
Bank of Greece Working Papers No. 39 and 40.) In addition to the paper by 
Hans Genberg, the Working Paper also contains the contributions of the 
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Exchange-Rate Arrangements and 
Financial Integration in East Asia: 





Executive Director (Research) 





Financial integration in Ease Asia is actively being pursued and will in due course 
lead to substantial mobility of capital between  economies in the region. Plans for 
monetary cooperation as a prelude to monetary integration and ultimately monetary 
unification are also proposed. These plans often suggest that central banks should 
adopt some form of common exchange rate policy in the transition period towards full 
monetary union. This paper argues that this is a dangerous path in the context of 
highly  integrated  financial  markets.  An  alternative  approach  is  proposed  where 
independent central banks coordinate their monetary policies through the adoption of 
common objectives and by building an appropriate institutional framework. When this 
coordination process has progressed to the point where interest rate developments are 
similar  across  the  region,  and  if  in  the  meantime  the  required  institutional 
infrastructure has been build, the next step towards monetary unification can be taken 
among those central banks that so desire. The claim is that this transition path is likely 







Paper prepared for the International Workshop on “Regional and International 
Currency Arrangements” co-organized by the Bank of Greece and the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, February 24-25, Vienna. The conclusions of the paper 
are strictly those of the author and should not be taken to represent those of the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority.   2 
Introduction. 
 
Although economic growth has resumed in East Asia since the crisis and 
contraction in the late 1990s, the experience of that period is still vividly in the minds 
of policy makers, and indeed the general public. An important question is therefore 
whether anything can and should be done to increase the resiliency of the region as a 
whole to shocks, and especially to shocks originating in international financial 
makets. 
 
Policy makers in East Asia see economic integration in the region as one way to 
consolidate growth and to prevent a recurrence of instability due to the perceived 
stop-go nature of international capital flows. Substantial integration of trade in goods 
has in fact already occurred as documented in a number of studies.
1  The emergence 
of Mainland China as a manufacturing hub is significant in this regard, as it imports 
large quantities of intermediate goods from other economics in the region, transforms 
them into final goods for exports to the rest of the world.   
 
The increased trade integration among economies in the region has led to calls 
for coordination of exchange rate policies lest competitive depreciations lead to 
artificial distortions in competitiveness, disruptions of trade, and dislocation of 
production. Not infrequently, the experience of Europe is used to argue that such 
exchange rate cooperation is necessary now that the degree of integration has reached 
levels close to that in Europe when the ERM was introduced. 
 
The degree of integration of financial markets is distinctly smaller. This is partly 
due to the controls on capital movements that some jurisdictions have maintained for 
a long time, but it is partly the result of the perception that the crisis of the late 
nineties was to some extent due to the vagaries of international capital flows. But at 
the same time it is of course recognised that international capital flows can bring 
substantial benefits. A response to this ambiguous attitude towards international 
capital flows has been to encourage financial integration within the region, although 
this should not be seen as an alternative to participating in the global financial system, 
but rather as a way to increase the size of local financial markets and thereby 
rendering them more resilient to swings in global capital flows.   
 
This paper takes these two developments, towards greater financial integration 
on the one hand and proposals for exchange rate coordination on the other, as given 
and asks what they imply for monetary policy regimes in the region. Section II briefly 
reviews some initiatives that are being pursued towards greater financial integration 
and argues that these initiatives will only achieve their full goal if substantial 
liberalization of capital flows between countries is undertaken.   
 
After a review of existing exchange rate practices and a characterisation of 
exchange rate behaviour in the region, section III considers the proposals for 
exchange rate coordination that have focused on some form of common exchange rate 
peg. The section emphasizes the difference between pegs that link the currencies to an 
external anchor and those that are based on an internal unit of account, and sets out 
the implications of each for the conduct of monetary policy in the countries that join 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Cutler et. al. (2004) and Zebregs (2004).   3 
such an exchange rate arrangement. 
 
Section IV addresses the question in the title of the paper and argues that the 
creation of fully integrated financial markets in the region and moving towards 
monetary unification may lead to undesirable outcomes unless the two processes are 
sequenced and designed carefully. It is argued that the path towards European 
monetary union provide useful lessons in this respect. These lessons should not, 
however, be that Asia should follow the European model of exchange rate 
stabilization in the context of liberalized international capital flows. The crises in the 
ERM during the 1990ies were not independent of the choice of this transition path 
towards the EMU. Instead Asian countries should follow a path where independent 
central banks coordinate their monetary policies, explicitly through some institutional 
framework or implicitly through the adoption of common objectives. When this 
coordination process has progressed to the point where interest rate developments are 
largely the same across the region, and if in the meantime the required institutional 
infrastructure has been build, the next step towards monetary unification can be taken 
among those central banks that so desire. I claim that this transition path is likely to be 
robust and will limit the risk of currency crises. 
 
The final section of the paper recalls that significant coordination of exchange 
rate policy requires equally significant coordination of interest rate policies in an 
environment where capital mobility is substantial. It then discusses the likelihood that 
individual jurisdictions in East Asia will be able and willing to give up 
decision-making power over monetary policy to a supranational coordinating 
institution, and concludes by sketching what the implications for the currency 




II. Integration of financial markets. 
 
The degree of international integration of domestic financial markets varies 
considerably across the countries that are the focus of this paper. Hong Kong, at one 
extreme, is completely open to international capital flows. Japan and Singapore are 
not far behind. At the other end of the spectrum there is Mainland China which has 
very strict controls de jure. There is some question as to the degree of de facto 
integration that is present, but it is quite clear from interest differentials that domestic 
and international financial markets are separated to an important degree. Malaysia 
imposed controls on capital flows in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, and 
while some of these have been eased, substantial impediments remain to create room 
for an independent domestic monetary policy. 
 
For the other countries in the region, the de jure degree of capital mobility as 
measured by looking at the IMF’s Annual report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions appears to quite limited, but the de facto mobility is almost 
certainly considerably larger. The reason for the diversity among the countries can be 
explained in part by their experiences during the Asian financial crisis and the lessons 
they drew from these (cf. Malaysia and Thailand), in part by the legacy of a generally 
closed economy (Mainland China), and in part by a desire to shield domestic financial 
institutions from external competition.     4 
 
The Asian financial crisis was a traumatic event in the region and it has spawned 
a number of initiatives for cooperation among central banks to enhance their ability to 
cope with volatile capital flows. The best known is perhaps the so-called Chiang Mai 
initiative. In its current form it consists of a set of bilateral swap agreements between 
central banks that increases the effective size of international reserves at the disposal 
of an individual central bank. While these swap agreements do not have any direct 
impact on private sector capital mobility, the intention behind them is presumably to 
make central banks better prepared for such flows. 
 
Another major official financial market project in the region is the development 
of an integrated Asian bond market.
2  One motivation behind this initiative is to 
facilitate the intermediation of funds inside the region. It is well documented (e.g. in 
McCauley (2003)) that much of the large volume of Asian savings is invested in 
developed-country assets with relatively low rates of return only to come back in the 
form of FDI and portfolio investments in high-return local assets. It is felt that a more 
developed regional bond market might allow local investors and savers to benefit 
more from this intermediation spread. 
 
  The Asian bond market initiative is also meant to encourage a broader and more 
efficient corporate bond market with the ultimate objective to lower the cost of funds 
for the corporate sector thereby increasing the rate of investment and growth. For this 
to materialize on a region-wide basis it will be necessary for countries that currently 
have restrictions on capital flows to remove them to a significant degree. The logic of 
the bond market initiative therefore implies substantially open capital markets in the 
region, which in view of the liberal regime in some countries, of course implies 
openness with respect to the world as a whole. The remainder of the paper thus takes 
it as given that the countries in the region will move in due course towards a regime of 
substantially open capital accounts. 
 
 
III. Exchange rate arrangements. 
 
1. The current situation. 
 
The current exchange rate arrangements in East Asia span the entire spectrum 
from a very hard peg in the case of Hong Kong’s currency board arrangement to the 
floating exchange rate of the Yen. Other jurisdictions in the region operate systems 
that fall in between with Mainland China and Malaysia being close to the fixed-rate 
end of the spectrum, South Korea closer to the opposite end and Indonesia, 
Philippines, Taiwan-China, and Thailand in between.   
 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong operates a currency board system with a commitment to keep the 
HKD between 7.75 and 7.85 HKD/USD.
3  All movements in the monetary base 
                                                 
2  See Ma and Remolona (2005) for a succinct description. 
3  Before 18 May 2005 the exchange rate system was asymmetric in the sense that there was a firm 
commitment not to let the Hong Kong dollar depreciate past 7.80 but there was no explicit commitment 
on the strong side. The so-called three refinements to the currency board system introduced on May 18 
established the current symmetric convertibility zone.   5 
reflect corresponding movements in the stock of international reserves. Local 
currency interest rates are therefore closely linked with their US dollar counterparts 
with very little no discretion on the part of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to 
influence them independently. 
 
Mainland China 
On July 21 2006 the Mainland Chinese authorities announced that they would 
shift from a fixed exchange rate (to the US dollar) to a managed floating system with 
reference to a basket of currencies. At the same time they announced a one-step initial 
appreciation of the RMB of 2.1% relative to the USD. The composition of the basket 
is not made known, but it is said to consist of at least seventeen currencies. While the 
bilateral RMB/USD exchange rate is much less volatile than most plausible basket 
rates, it is possible to detect both a weak trend-like appreciation of the renminbi and a 
tendency to move with a basket. 
 
Malaysia 
After having pegged the Ringgit tightly to the US dollar since September 1998, 
the Malaysian authorities announced a move to a basket peg at the same time as 
Mainland China changed its system. The basket is not disclosed and the bilateral USD 
rate is still far less volatile than the effective exchange rate. As in China, controls on 
capital movements permit local interest rates to deviate from the US counterparts 




The Monetary Authority of Singapore is unique among the central banks in the 
region in that it uses the effective exchange rate actively as an intermediate target to 
reach an inflation target. In other words, it can be classified as following an inflation 
targeting regime although it does not describe itself that way. The basket used as the 
intermediate target is not disclosed.   
 
Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan/China, Thailand 
The central banks in these jurisdictions are self-proclaimed inflation targeters 
using a short-term interest rate as the intermediate target. Of course, inflation targeting 
does not have to mean that no attention is paid to the exchange rate when interest rate 
decisions are made, so it is quite possible that the exchange rates of these economies 
follow systematic patterns in relation to main trading partners. Regression results 
discussed below illustrate this point. 
 
Japan 
As already noted, among the Asian currencies covered in this paper, the Japanese 
Yen probably comes closest to the traditional definition of a freely floating one. Even 
so, the results reported in the Appendix show that the movements of the Yen-US 






                                                 
4  McCauley (2006).   6 
2. Characterizing fluctuations in Asian currencies. 
 
2.1 Movements against the UD dollar. 
Ho, Ma, and McCauley (2005) argue that movements in Asian currencies are 
increasingly related to those of a wider group of trading partners than just the US 
dollar. They illustrate this point in two ways, by calculating the ratio of US dollar 
exchange rate volatility to effective exchange rate volatility on the one hand, and by 
regressing movements of individual dollar exchange rates on dollar exchange rates of 
major local trading partners/competitors on the other.   
 
If Asia was on a dollar standard (McKinnon and Schnabel (2003)) the ratio of US 
dollar volatility to effective rate volatility would be very small. Conversely for a 
country that stabilizes the effective exchange rate, the ratio would be very large. 
Graph 2 in Ho, Ma, and McCauley(2005) (reproduced below) shows that - with the 
notable exception of Hong Kong, Mainland China, and Malaysia - the volatility ratio 







Regressions of the form   
 
￿ + D a + a = D
j
t , i t , j j 0 t , i u S S      i j ¹               (1) 
 
where Sk represents the US dollar exchange rate of currency k, can be used to assess 
whether a particular currency is more or less rigidly pegged to another. If a coefficient 
￿j is equal to unity and if ui,t is ‘small’ for all t then currency i is pegged to currency j. 
If all ￿:s are zero and the ui:s are small, then the currency is pegged to the US dollar. 
When some ￿:s are non-zero, then currency i is systematically related to the 
currencies corresponding to the non-zero coefficients. Such relationship could come 
about either because the central bank is actively managing the currency or simply   7 
because the behaviour of currency traders/investors in the market generates a 
correlation between particular currencies.
5 
 
In the Appendix I tabulate the results of regressions of the form (1) using weekly 
data for the main East Asian currencies for the period since January 1, 2000 and for 
various sub-periods. The following points can be made on the basis of these results. 
 
·  Looking at the results for the full sample period, it is evident that the evolution of 
the Singapore dollar, the New Taiwanese dollar, and the Thai bhat depend quite 
strongly on movements in the Euro, the Japanese Yen, and the South Korean Won. 
For these currencies the effective exchange rate orientation (as opposed to a pure 
dollar orientation) emphasised by Ho, Ma, and McCauley using daily data is 
clearly present also in weekly data. Movements in the Indonesian rupee and the 
Philippines peso on the other hand are quite idiosyncratic.
6  The won reacts 
systematically to the yen, and changes in the yen correlate positively with those of 
the euro. 
 
·  Comparison of the regression coefficients across different sample periods reveals 
a certain degree of instability over time. Two possible explanations could account 
for that. If regression coefficients are capturing deliberate exchange rate 
management, then instability would indicate changes over time in the composition 
of the basket that forms the basis of the managed exchange rate policy. On the 
other hand if significant regression coefficients reflect common underlying shocks, 
then instability would simply mean that different shocks have been present in 
different time periods.   
 
·  Finally it is noteworthy that there are considerable differences across countries in 
the way their currencies relate to movements in the euro, yen, and the won. 
Different trade patterns or differences in economic structure which translates into 
differences in the reaction to common shocks are potential explanations. 
 
 
2.2 Measures of intra-region exchange rate variability 
 
Intra-regional exchange rate volatility will appear when individual currencies in 
the region react differently to movements in the dollar, the euro, and the yen. As there 
is no single perfect measure of the overall degree of intra-regional exchange rate 
variability, Table 2.1 presents summary statistics based on a very simple construct, the 
equally-weighted geometric average of all currencies in the region.
7,8   
 
The figures in the table confirm that there are significant differences in the 
                                                 
5  An example might be the relationship between the Swiss Frank and the Euro. In a regression of 
movements of the former on the latter is likely to show a dependence of the CHF/USD rate on the 
EUR/USD rate even though the Swiss National Bank does not engage in systematic exchange rate 
management.   
6  Pegging to the US dollar can be ruled out by inspection. 
7  ‘All’ currencies should be understood to mean all currencies considered in this paper. 
8  The measures are calculated as follows. First all US dollar exchange rates are converted into indices 
with an average value of 100 for the sample period as a whole. The geometric average of these indices 
is then calculated using equal weights. Finally percentage deviations of each individual series from the 
geometric average are calculated. The summary statistics in Table 2.1 are based on these deviations.   8 
behaviour of individual currencies in the region. Not surprisingly, the countries 
(Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand) whose currencies were shown to have the 
most systematic effective exchange rate orientation in the regression results also have 
the smallest deviation from the regional average.   
 
 






value   
Standard 
deviation  Maximum  Minimum 
Singapore  1.7    2.3    7.0    -3.3   
Taiwan, China  2.0    2.4    4.5    -6.4   
Thailand  2.1    2.6    6.6    -4.6   
Hong Kong SAR  2.4    3.2    8.7    -5.9   
Malaysia  2.4    3.2    8.9    -6.0   
China, Mainland  2.5    3.3    9.1    -5.9   
Japan  3.7    4.4    11.3    -8.1   
South Korea  4.6    5.9    10.0    -13.2   
Indonesia  6.1    7.3    22.0    -15.9   
Philippines  6.7    7.7    11.5    -16.1   
For reference:         
Sweden  2.5  3.5  9.4  -10.4 
Switzerland  2.1  2.6  5.8  -5.3 




Whether the size of the deviations shown in the table should be considered large 
or not is difficult to determine in the absolute. A standard of comparison is given in 
the last two rows of the table, where figures are given for the percentage deviations of 
the euro exchange rates of the Swedish krona and the Swiss franc from their 
respective sample averages. These countries are chosen as they are both small highly 
open economies that trade intensively with the euro area. It is therefore interesting to 
note that the size of the fluctuations of their currencies relative to the euro lies 
somewhere in the middle of the ranking of East Asian currencies even though they 
profess to have freely floating exchange rates.   
 
The stylized facts presented in this section describe the environment within which 
discussions about the desirability of some form of coordinated exchange rate policy in 
the region take place. In view of the strong degree of trade integration between the 
countries in the region, there have been proposals for some form of coordinated 
exchange rate arrangement. The objective seems to be to limit fluctuations in bilateral 
real exchange in response to external shocks or reduce temptations to resort to 





   9 
3. Proposals for coordinated exchange-rate policies and their implications for 
monetary policy 
 
3.1.  Alternative currency pegs in Asia. 
 
The leading proposal for a coordinated exchange rate arrangement in the region 
appears to be the so-called BBC (Basket-Band-Crawl) proposal.
9  As the name 
suggests, this proposal entails defining a currency basket to which each individual 
currency would be pegged, allowing for a band around the central rate and allowing 
the central rate to change slowly. The basket would be the same (or at least very 
similar) across countries in order for the implied bilateral exchange rates to be stable. 
 
The ‘band’ and ‘crawl’ aspects of the BBC proposal have important implications 
for the credibility of the system which will be discussed in the next section. Here I 
want to focus on the implications for monetary policy of the composition of the basket 
so I will for simplicity consider the pure case with no bands and zero rate of crawl. 
 
The main issue appears to be the choice of an ‘external’ reference basket and an 
‘internal’ reference basket. By a pure external basket is meant an arrangement in 
which each country in the region would peg its currency to a basket made up of 
currencies not belonging to the region, whereas a pure internal basket implies pegging 
to a basket made up entirely of currencies of the region itself. While both systems 
would lead to stability of bilateral exchange rates between the currencies within the 
region, they have widely different implications for the determinants of monetary 
conditions. 
 
3.2.  What determines monetary policy in a pegged exchange rate system? 
 
To appreciate this, consider a stylized case where we only have four countries: 
two countries (￿, ￿) within the region and two counties (A, B) outside. An outside 
basket would be a weighted average of the currencies of A and B. In order to avoid 
fluctuations in the bilateral exchange between ￿ and ￿ due to changes in the bilateral 
exchange rate between A and B, the weights in the baskets to which ￿ and ￿ are 
pegging must be the same, wA and 1-wA. 
 
Suppose now that both ￿ and ￿ peg their respective currencies to this common 
basket. With internationally integrated financial markets, their interest rates must then 





. iA + (1-wA)
. iB 
 
In other words, the monetary conditions in each of the countries, as defined by the rate 
of interest, will be determined by the monetary conditions in the rest of the world. 
 
Contrast this with the case of pegging to a common internal basket. In this case 
the common interest rate will be a weighted average of the interest rates of each of the 
countries in the region (assuming that all of them are included in the currency basket). 
In other words, pegging the exchange rates of each of the members will not itself 
                                                 
9  See Williamson (2005).   10 
determine monetary policy conditions in the region. This is of course nothing else 
than the familiar n-1 problem in a fixed rate system. If n countries form an internally 
defined fixed exchange rate zone, there will be 1 degree of freedom which must be 
used to set the interest rate for the system as a whole. How exactly this can be done is 
discussed in section ….. 
 
It the case of East Asia it is frequently suggested that a mixed internal and 
external basket be used for the region. For example, ….. suggests that a weighted 
average of the UD dollar, the Euro and the Yen should be used. In this case, and if 
Japan is part of the exchange rate arrangement, the interest rate in Japan, which will 
be the interest rate also in the other countries in the zone, will be defined by 
 
iJapanwUS
. iUS + wEURO

















In other words, from the point of view of a the evolution of interest rates in the 
exchange rate zone, and hence the control of monetary policy, the mixed basket is like 
the external basket in that external factors will complete determine monetary 
conditions in the zone.   
 
 
IV. A Collision Course? 
 
I have argued that the revealed preference of Asian policy makers is to create a 
financially integrated region. There are also proposals, mostly but not exclusively 
from academic and policy lobby circles, to introduce cooperation in the area of 
exchange rate policy that will take the form of a common basket peg in the region. In 
this section I examine a number of issues that arise from these aims. 
 
It is well-known that free capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate are 
compatible only if monetary policy (and indeed macroeconomic policy in general) is 
subordinated to the fixed exchange rate objective. It is not only current policies that 
matter, but also expectations about how policy makers will react to shocks. In other 
words, the commitment of the authorities to maintaining the fixed rate must be very 
strong in order for speculative attacks not to materialize. The European exchange rate 
experiences in the early 1990s provide pertinent lessons; countries (Austria and the 
Netherlands are the most clear examples) that for many years had made it clear that 
they had no intention to carry out anything but a DEM based monetary/exchange rate 
policy were not affected, whereas countries with less strong commitments were. 
 
The idea behind the title of this paper then is that policy initiatives and discussions   11 
in Asia with respect to financial market integration and exchange rate policy may be 
on a collision course in the sense that, if implemented, conditions may be established 
that will bring about an eventual exchange rate crisis. 
 
 
1.  Unstable paths towards monetary integration. 
 
Suppose that there is a desire to establish a truly fixed exchange rate zone, i.e. a 
monetary union, in the region in the long term.
10  One way to do so would be to 
follow the European model and create a common basket peg among the participating 
countries and start to work on the establishment of the institutional infrastructure 
required to operate a monetary union. The common basket system would make 
allowances for bands around central parities and possibly for rates of crawl of the 
parities themselves.   
 
If such a system was operating in the context of substantially free capital mobility, 
the risk of currency speculation and crisis would be present, particularly if the bands 
around the parities were narrow, and if there were reasons to believe that the 
commitment to the exchange rate objective was less than absolute. To reduce the risk 
of speculative attacks one may contemplate making the exchange rate bands rather 
wide, for example as wide as the    15% bands introduced in August 1993 into the 
ERM in Europe after the turbulence in the system. While this might reduce the 
likelihood of exchange rate crises it does so at the cost of potentially large fluctuations 
in exchange rates, exactly what the common peg proposal is intended to eliminate. 
More fundamentally in my opinion is that a very wide band for the exchange rate all 
but eliminates it as a nominal anchor in the economy. It is therefore essential in such a 
system that each country specifies an alternative monetary policy strategy, and that 
these strategies be mutually consistent. In other words, the monetary policy 
coordination that is supposed to emerge from the common exchange rate peg must be 
specified separately. 
 
Allowing for crawling central parities will not solve the problem. If the rate of 
crawl is predetermined and fixed, all that is gained is a differenced between the 
countries in the level of interest rates and the average rates of inflation. There will be 
no added policy autonomy to deal with short- and medium-term disturbances. The risk 
of a currency crisis is only altered in so far as allowing for differences in average 
inflation rates makes the arrangement more credible. In my view this is questionable, 
although others may think differently. If the rate of crawl is made discretionary, the 
role of the system as a nominal anchor is again reduced, and as discussed above, some 
alternative method of monetary policy coordination must be found.   
 
To reduce the risk that a pegged exchange rate arrangement will break down some 
may suggest that countries should retain, or introduce as the case may be, some 
controls on international capital movements. Three considerations speak against such 
an approach. First, it seems to go against the revealed preferences of Asian policy 
makers who approvingly speak of the creation of an integrated Asian financial market. 
                                                 
10  I am leaving aside the question of the composition of such a zone for the moment, and indeed 
whether its creation is likely in the foreseeable future. These issues will be discussed in the next 
section.   12 
Second, an presumably not unrelated, maintaining capital controls for extended 
periods of time would prevent Asian countries from reaping the gains from 
international capital mobility.
11  Third, and most importantly if the ultimate goal of the 
common exchange rate policy is monetary unification, capital controls would have to 
be eliminated some time before exchange rates are permanently locked and a common 
monetary policy is implemented. The reason is simply that a fully integrated financial 
market must be in place in order for a centrally determined monetary policy to be 
transmitted evenly and rapidly to each part of the monetary union. So this approach 
would imply the coexistence for some period of time of fixed exchange rates, free 
movements of capital, and potentially different monetary policies, that is the 
ingredients susceptible of leading to currency crises.   
 
 
2.  An alternative Asian path towards monetary stability and, if desired, 
monetary unification. 
 
The model for the creation of a zone of monetary stability that emerged in Europe 
after the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system focussed on stabilizing 
intra-European exchange rates. Formal mechanisms for the coordination of monetary 
policies were weak. Arguably the objectives of monetary policies across the continent 
were not even consistent with fixed exchange rates until the goals pursued by the 
German Bundesbank became the de facto common goals of other future members of 
the Euro area. In the meantime, and even afterwards since the commitments to follow 
the lead of the Bundesbank were not always believed, currency realignments were 
needed and often accompanied by mini crises. As restrictions on capital flows were 
finally eliminated altogether without full monetary coordination, the maxi crises of 
the 1990s erupted.   
 
Rather than following the European approach towards the creation of monetary 
stability in the region, Asian central banks are well advised to adopt their own strategy 
that will be more robust and that can, if desired, lead to the same ultimate outcome. 
The approach must be compatible with liberalization of capital flows, possibly at 
different speeds in different countries but with the ultimate aim of creating a fully 
integrated market. Furthermore it must recognize that full monetary union requires a 
single monetary policy determined by a single central bank. It is therefore necessary 
that the approach leads to an agreement on the form of such an institution and on its 
mandate. This will not happen unless the objectives of existing monetary authorities 
are compatible. Although these requirements may sound daunting, it is possible to 
sketch the outlines of an evolutionary approach towards the creation of a zone of 
monetary stability and financial integration in Asia based on these principles. The key 
is to allow each central bank to implement its own monetary policy during the 
transition period, but to agree on a consistent objective to be pursued by all.
12  The 
obvious candidate for such an objective is an inflation target. In the past twenty-odd 
years inflation targeting has emerged as the dominant paradigm for monetary policy. 
While there can be many flavours of inflation targeting, the one essential common 
element is that control of inflation should be the overriding objective of monetary 
                                                 
11  As already noted, there is some dispute as to the size of these gains, but they are presumably 
positive. 
12  Note that unless such an agreement can be achieved, there is no point in trying to achieve monetary 
unification in the first place.   13 
policy. 
 
The first element of an Asian approach towards creating a region of monetary 
stability should thus be to adopt common objectives for central bank policies in the 
region, and these should be stated in terms of an inflation target.
13  To be compatible 
with liberalization of international capital flows, there should be no commitment 
towards maintaining a particular exchange rate level. Of course, this does not mean 
that the exchange rate should be ignored in the implementation of the monetary policy 
strategy. Indeed there is a presumption that attention should be paid to the information 
contained in exchange rate movements when the inflation targeting strategy is 
implemented.
14   
 
As financial markets become fully integrated, and if inflation objectives of the 
regional central banks are sufficiently similar, interest rates are likely to become 
highly correlated across the economies. Exchange rates are also likely to be relatively 
stable. These assertions follow logically if the economies in question are subject to 
similar types of shocks and therefore follow similar cyclical evolutions, conditions 




 Once interest rate policies have converged, countries can formally agree to 
centralize monetary policy decisions in a common central bank, which has been 
established in the intervening period, or they can decide to delegate it to an existing 
central bank.
16  In the first case the delegation of monetary policy will be carried out 
simultaneously with the introduction of a new common currency, and in the second 
case with making the currency of the chosen central bank the common currency in the 
group. Of course, there is no requirement that the last step of the approach – that of 
adopting a common currency – be implemented by all countries in the region. The 
benefits from financial integration and monetary stability will be forthcoming anyway 
even if those of a common currency will not.   
 
The advantages of the approach to monetary integration that I have sketched here 
over the alternative approach based on the European model of exchange rate 
stabilization are that it is compatible with increasing integration of financial markets, 
it naturally evolves from a system where central banks pursue similar objectives in 
their own self interest which makes it incentive compatible, and it allows for a 
‘variable geometry’ of the final area that adopts a common currency. In the next and 
final section I examine briefly what this geometry might look like in East Asia. 
 
                                                 
13  For central banks such as the Hong Kong Monetary Authority that have a long-standing successful 
commitment to a rigidly fixed exchange rate in the context of complete capital mobility, there is no 
compelling reason to switch to inflation targeting. The following discussion thus refers to central banks 
that have followed discretionary monetary policies in the past. 
14  It is also quite possible to use the exchange rate rather than some short-term interest rate as the 
operating target. This is indeed the approach of the Monetary Authority of Singapore. 
15  There should be no illusion that the exchange rates will not fluctuate. Switzerland is highly 
integrated with economies in the Euro area and the Swiss National Bank has much the same objectives 
as the European Central Bank, yet the exchange rate between the Swiss Frank and the Euro does 
display a nontrivial degree of volatility. 
16  Wyplosz (2004) emphasizes the role of institution building in the process of monetary integration 
process in Europe.     14 
 
V. How many currencies in East Asia?
17 
 
 The successful introduction of the euro and the success of the ECB in delivering 
monetary stability have naturally raised the question whether East Asia might be the 
next  candidate  for  monetary  unification.  Not  surprisingly,  academics  have  had  a 
field-day  trying  to  determine  whether  on  optimum  currency  area  (OCA) 
considerations such a development would be feasible. Not surprisingly, there is no 
clear-cut answer, but a number of authors suggest that East Asian economies are no 
less an OCA than Europe was when it started its process towards unification.
18  In 
view of the additional real integration that is likely to take place between now and the 
time the renminbi becomes fully convertible and financial markets in the region fully 
integrated, it is thus likely that East Asia would pass the OCA criteria as well (or 
badly depending on one’s point of view) as the euro area did in 1998.   
 
 But in discussing monetary unification it is essential to keep in mind that a 
monetary union between a set of economies implies a single common currency which 
in turn requires a single common central bank. For this reason the decision to establish 
a monetary union becomes intensely political. Indeed, European monetary integration 
was as much, if not more, a political process as an economic one. Without strong 
support from the political leadership in France and Germany it is unlikely to have 
come about at all. Will the two dominant countries in East Asia, China and Japan, be 
able to play a similar role? In present circumstances this does not seem likely, but 
much water can flow under the bridge during a period between the initial proposals 
for monetary unification and its eventual realization. Judging by the European 
experience this can take as long as twenty years. 
 
 Nevertheless, even though current tensions will surely subside, it is difficult to 
imagine that the political pendulum will swing so far and so rapidly as to bring about 
a  consensus  within  the  current  generation  of  leaders  in  favour  of  a  supranational 
monetary authority in East Asia that would be vested with the same independence as 
the  ECB  enjoys  in  the  euro  area.  Independent  monetary  policies  and  a  floating 
exchange rate between China and Japan appear to be the more likely outcome for the 
foreseeable future.   
 
Where does this leave the other economies in the region? The economies of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan are likely to integrate more and more comprehensively with the 
Mainland in the coming years. Economic cycles and price developments will become 
increasingly similar. On OCA grounds a greater monetary integration would be 
justified.   
 
 For other countries the outcome is less clear. As the third largest, South Korea’s 
economy will have a size of something like a fifth and a third of those of Japan and 
China respectively. It will increase its trade and financial relations with both of its 
neighbours. It seems unlikely therefore to link its monetary fortunes completely with 
either one, especially since it also trades significantly with the US and Europe. In the 
absence of a region-wide exchange rate agreement it could well therefore also 
                                                 
17  This section draws heavily on Chapter 5 of Genberg, McCauley, Persaud, and Park (2005). 
18  Park (2004) and Ito and Park (2004) review the empirical literature.   15 
continue to opt for an independent monetary policy based on a domestic objective 
such as an inflation target. 
 
 Four other countries in the region – Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Singapore – are also inflation targeters.
19  As argued above, this strategy is likely to be 
robust both as a transition arrangement towards monetary integration should this be 
deemed desirable and as an arrangement that will promote monetary stability among 
increasingly integrated independent monetary jurisdictions. The experiences of other 
small highly open economies support this claim. Canada, Norway, Sweden, and 
Switzerland are examples of economies that are highly integrated with neighbouring 
large currency areas and yet they are quite successfully pursuing independent 
monetary policies based on inflation targets. 
 
 What do these arguments imply for the ‘currency map’ of East Asia in a ten to 
twenty year horizon, assuming the renminbi will then be convertible? The discussion 
suggests that the renminbi, the won, and the yen will remain independent currencies 
and the corresponding central banks would gear monetary policy towards achieving 
internal stability objectives. The Hong Kong and the New Taiwanese dollars might 
become tightly linked to the renminbi. Further south and east there are two main 
scenarios. One is that countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
and Thailand follow the successful inflation targeting model of many other countries 
in the world and retain independence of monetary policy with exchange rates that 
adjust (freely or in a managed fashion like Singapore is currently doing) as needed to 
achieve domestic goals.   
 
 The other model is that the smaller countries in the region will have decided that 
monetary unification is in their best common interest. After transiting through a period 
with independent but increasingly similar monetary policies as suggested in section 
IV.2, they will have established a common central bank, the SEAMA (South East 
Asian Monetary Authority) and introduced a common currency, the SEAMU (South 
East Asian Monetary Unit). 
 
Whether one or the other of scenarios is played out, the region will be one with 
substantially integrated financial markets and with interest rate policies that are set 
independently by several central banks pursuing price stability as their principal 
objective. Interest rate movements are nevertheless be quite similar across the 
monetary areas because of the similarity in policy objectives and the high degree of 
real economic integration in the region. In jurisdictions that have retained their 
currencies exchange rates will be allowed to vary, but in view of the importance of 
exchange rate movements for inflation, monetary policy will pay close attention to 
such movements and de facto limit their size. Central banks that can agree to delegate 
their monetary policy to a supranational agency or a foreign central bank may form a 
currency union. The transition to such a union will be based on a common vision of 
                                                 
19  While the first three countries use a short-term interest rate as the operating target, Singapore has 
developed a strategy of targeting inflation based on using the effective exchange rate as the operating 
target. It has enjoyed considerable success in doing so. For recent discussions of monetary policy 
strategies in East Asian countries see the papers presented at the BIS/HKIMR conference on ‘Monetary 
Policy Approaches and Implementation in Asia” available at 
https://www.hkimr.org/conferences_detail.asp?id=20&callfrom=previous&page=1 
   16 
the objectives of monetary policy and not on a straightjacket based on an exchange 
rate peg. For this reason it will not be plagued by currency crises. The collision 
between financial integration and exchange rate arrangements will have been avoided. 
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Appendix 
 
Regression results using weekly data from 2000 to 2005. The estimated equation has 
the log-change in the US dollar value of the currency in the first column as the 
dependent variable and the log-change in the euro, the yen, and the won as the 
dependent variable (except as noted in the table). 
 
 
Full Sample       
           
    EUR  JPY  KRW  R
2 
           
           
  IDR  0.079  0.082  0.371  0.050 
    (0.297)  (0.368)  (0.006)   
  JPY  0.342  n.a.  n.a.  0.140 
    (0.000)  n.a.  n.a.   
  KRW  -0.008  0.269  n.a.  0.176 
    (0.805)  (0.000)  n.a.   
  PHP  0.017  0.065  0.117  0.039 
    (0.631)  (0.115)  (0.056)   
  SGD  0.146  0.180  0.165  0.519 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
  THB  0.115  0.191  0.232  0.332 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
  TWD  0.059  0.089  0.248  0.350 
    (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
           
 
 
Year 2000       
           
    EUR  JPY  KRW  R
2 
           
           
  IDR  0.019  0.012  0.169  0.004 
    (0.918)  (0.967)  (0.692)   
  JPY  -0.012  n.a.  n.a.  0.000 
    (0.904)  n.a.  n.a.   
  KRW  -0.104  0.182  n.a.  0.127 
    (0.096)  (0.051)  n.a.   
  PHP  -0.031  -0.188  0.153  0.047 
    (0.732)  (0.175)  (0.467)   
  SGD  0.143  0.160  0.052  0.286 
    (0.001)  (0.016)  (0.597)   
  THB  0.129  0.193  0.099  0.106 
    (0.122)  (0.124)  (0.603)   
  TWD  0.030  0.062  0.248  0.284 
    (0.329)  (0.179)  (0.001)   
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Year 2001       
           
    EUR  JPY  KRW  R
2 
           
           
  IDR  0.111  0.066  0.991  0.088 
    (0.735)  (0.844)  (0.057)   
  JPY  0.259  n.a.  n.a.  0.067 
    (0.062)  n.a.  n.a.   
  KRW  -0.163  0.236  n.a.  0.150 
    (0.068)  (0.009)  n.a.   
  PHP  -0.128  0.270  0.049  0.109 
    (0.305)  (0.039)  (0.802)   
  SGD  0.120  0.105  0.221  0.295 
    (0.037)  (0.075)  (0.015)   
  THB  -0.016  0.145  0.372  0.340 
    (0.816)  (0.043)  (0.001)   
  TWD  0.143  -0.061  0.124  0.150 
    (0.007)  (0.247)  (0.126)   
           
 
Year 2002       
           
    EUR  JPY  KRW  R
2 
           
           
  IDR  0.265  0.140  0.037  0.130 
    (0.196)  (0.475)  (0.889)   
  JPY  0.780  n.a.  n.a.  0.442 
    (0.000)  n.a.  n.a.   
  KRW  0.041  0.337  n.a.  0.359 
    (0.703)  (0.001)  n.a.   
  PHP  0.189  0.118  -0.107  0.242 
    (0.041)  (0.179)  (0.374)   
  SGD  0.094  0.269  0.030  0.671 
    (0.084)  (0.000)  (0.667)   
  THB  0.189  0.254  0.106  0.493 
    (0.055)  (0.008)  (0.404)   
  TWD  0.069  0.127  0.205  0.465 
    (0.286)  (0.042)  (0.018)   
           
 
Year 2003       
           
    EUR  JPY  KRW  R
2 
           
           
  IDR  -0.038  0.159  0.306  0.222 
    (0.627)  (0.143)  (0.012)   
  JPY  0.341  n.a.  n.a.  0.192 
    (0.001)  n.a.  n.a.   
  KRW  0.061  0.306  n.a.  0.170 
    (0.518)  (0.015)  n.a.   
  PHP  0.028  0.080  0.123  0.091 
    (0.684)  (0.388)  (0.227)   
  SGD  0.130  0.221  0.221  0.632 
    (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.001)   
  THB  0.035  0.233  0.183  0.375 
    (0.540)  (0.004)  (0.033)   
  TWD  0.000  0.151  0.082  0.357 
    (0.992)  (0.001)  (0.091)   
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Year 2004       
           
    EUR  JPY  KRW  R
2 
           
           
  IDR  0.079  0.162  0.231  0.118 
    (0.525)  (0.228)  (0.339)   
  JPY  0.385  n.a.  n.a.  0.141 
    (0.005)  n.a.  n.a.   
  KRW  0.053  0.244  n.a.  0.252 
    (0.462)  (0.001)  n.a.   
  PHP  0.081  -0.001  -0.005  0.088 
    (0.045)  (0.980)  (0.948)   
  SGD  0.169  0.260  0.022  0.684 
    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.770)   
  THB  0.104  0.139  0.374  0.489 
    (0.067)  (0.024)  (0.001)   
  TWD  0.019  0.096  0.477  0.627 
    (0.623)  (0.027)  (0.000)   
           
 
Year 2005       
           
    EUR  JPY  KRW  R
2 
           
           
  IDR  0.091  -0.139  0.306  0.047 
    (0.529)  (0.377)  (0.187)   
  JPY  0.544  n.a.  n.a.  0.321 
    (0.000)  n.a.  n.a.   
  KRW  0.078  0.225  n.a.  0.215 
    (0.381)  (0.017)  n.a.   
  PHP  0.081  0.047  0.061  0.100 
    (0.247)  (0.535)  (0.587)   
  SGD  0.153  0.158  0.305  0.701 
    (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.000)   
  THB  0.104  0.161  0.314  0.532 
    (0.079)  (0.014)  (0.001)   
  TWD  0.019  0.169  0.397  0.477 
    (0.767)  (0.018)  (0.000)   
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The question that Hans Genberg, executive director for research at the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority raises in his insightful article “Exchange-Rate Arrangements and 
Financial Integration in East Asia: On a Collision Course?” deserves close attention. The 
essence of his argument is that if the monetary authorities in East Asia pursue sound 
monetary policies aimed at long-run price stability, exchange rates will be less volatile 
and both real and financial sectors will benefit.  Greater financial integration in the 
region, which must necessarily accompany greater trade flows, means that capital 
freedom is an essential long-term policy goal.  At present the biggest player in the region, 
China, still has a mostly closed capital account.  Although Genberg does not discuss how 
to end financial repression in China, I will address that issue.  But first, I wish to briefly 
summarize and discuss the key points in his article. 
 
Monetary Stability in East Asia 
  Genberg surveys the current exchange-rate regimes in East Asia—Hong Kong’s 
currency board system; China and Malaysia’s managed float with respect to a currency 
basket; Singapore’s currency basket approach but with an inflation target regime using 
the effective exchange rate as an intermediate target; Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand’s somewhat flexible exchange rate regimes with central bank 
policy aimed at an inflation target using a short-term interest rate as the intermediate 
target; and Japan’s “floating-rate” system. 
Monetary unification is a long way off in this region.  Clearly, the European model 
of a single currency and a supranational central bank is neither economically nor 
politically feasible now or in the near future.  Genberg assumes that East Asian countries 
will eventually liberalize capital flows, a necessary condition for later monetary 
unification.  But he recognizes that sequencing matters and that Asian countries “should  
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follow a path where independent central banks coordinate monetary policies”—either 
“explicitly through some institutional framework or implicitly through the adoption of 
common objectives.”  Those countries that later desired closer ties could bind themselves 
to a common currency, but that would be a bottom-up rather than a top-down process.  
Spontaneous unification makes a great deal of sense.   
In the case of Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan, one could argue that the increasingly 
close and strong trade and financial ties will naturally lead to a more significant role for 
the renminbi (RMB).  One could envision modifying the Hong Kong currency board to 
include both the dollar and the yuan, with an increasing weight being given to the yuan.
1 
With capital account liberalization in China, people would be free to choose among the 
parallel currencies and it is likely that a single currency (the RMB) could emerge as the 
key currency.  Of course, the yen, the dollar, and the euro would continue to be strong 
international currencies.  
The pace of the transition, of course, will depend on politics as much as on 
economics.  Until China is willing to allow a freer flow of information and greater capital 
freedom, including privatization of capital assets and liberalization of interest rates, it is 
premature to talk about financial integration and currency competition. 
       
A Currency Basket Approach 
A true currency basket approach would require transparency so that currencies in 
the basket were fully convertible and the weights known.  Arbitrage would keep the 
market price of the basket in line with the official price, and the domestic currency would 
maintain its purchasing power relative to the basket, while allowing market forces to 
determine bilateral exchange rates.
2  For example, with respect to China,  the RMB/dollar 
rate could vary, while the value of the RBM relative to the basket would remain stable.  
China has not adopted such an approach; the RMB/dollar rate was allowed to appreciate 
                                                 
1 See Kam Hon Chu, “From Relink to Parallel Currencies to Monetary Union,” HKCER Letters 75 (Sept.-
Oct. 2003). Available at www.hku/hkcer/articles/v75/khchu.htm. 
2 Ibid., pp. 3–4.  
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by 2.1 percent in July 2005, when the new exchange rate regime was announced, but has 
only been allowed to increase by less than 1 percent since that time. 
  The Singapore system may be described as a “Basket-Band-Crawl” (BBC), but as 
Bennett McCallum has recently argued, it is better seen as an inflation target system in 
which the exchange rate is used as  “an intermediate information or instrument variable 
that is involved in the procedures used to achieve the objective of low inflation, 
augmented perhaps by output gap considerations. The Singapore system is, therefore, one 
variant of a floating exchange-rate regime.”
3  The Monetary Authority of Singapore has 
allowed substantial appreciation of the Singapore dollar on a trade-weighted basis to 
avoid domestic inflation.
4  McCallum does not see China adopting a Singapore-type 
system. 
 
Avoiding a Collision Course 
 Assuming that financial integration is a major policy objective in East Asia, 
would the adoption of a common basket peg be stabilizing or result in an exchange-rate 
crisis?  That is the central issue of Genberg’s article, which he explores in section IV. 
There would be bands around the central parities and the parities themselves would  
be flexible.  Such a system, notes Genberg, would not be immune to speculative attacks 
in a world of capital mobility.  Moreover, widening the bands would weaken the nominal 
exchange rate anchor, as would a discretionary crawl.  Genberg argues that introducing 
capital controls to mitigate exchange-rate crises under a pegged (basket) regime would be 
unwise.  The problem is that with no common monetary policy, a pegged exchange rate 
regime and free capital mobility could lead to currency crises.  For that reason, Genberg 
favors the establishment of “a zone of monetary stability” in East Asia rather than a 
common basket peg.   
                                                 
3 Bennett T. McCallum, “Is Singapore the Model for China’s New Exchange Rate Policy?” Paper prepared 
for the Shadow Open Market Committee Meeting, December 5–6, 2005, pp. 10–11. 
4 Ibid., pp. 3–4.  
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  The transition to the zone would be “evolutionary” with “each central bank to 
implement its own monetary policy during the transition period, but to agree on a 
consistent objective to be pursued by all.”  His preferred objective is inflation targeting.    
To meet that objective and to realize financial integration, “there should be no 
commitment towards maintaining a particular exchange rate level.”  With stable money 
and free capital flows, exchange rates should a l s o  b e  r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  i n  t h e  r e g i o n ,  
assuming those economies are subject to similar shocks. 
  The key conclusion, which I fully support, is that monetary stability and capital 
freedom do not necessitate a common currency or a supranational central bank: “The 
benefits from financial integration and monetary stability will be forthcoming anyway 
even if those of a common currency will not.”  Instead of following Europe’s approach to 
monetary unification through exchange-rate stabilization, Genberg’s approach is 
noteworthy because “it naturally evolves from a system where central banks pursue 
similar objectives in their own self interest.”   
 
The Financial Architecture in East Asia 
  The objective in establishing a club of financial stability in East Asia is to make 
price stability the primary goal of monetary policy, while allowing each country or group 
of countries to select an appropriate exchange-rate regime consistent with capital 
freedom—that is, financial integration.  Genberg believes, as I do, that China and Japan 
would best be served by using domestic monetary policy to stabilize the domestic price 
level while allowing the foreign exchange value of the RMB and yen to be determined by 
market forces.  Hong Kong will likely link its currency more closely to the RMB as that 
currency becomes fully convertible.  And at some point Taiwan may also find it 
beneficial to adopt the RMB—but that obviously will not occur until the Mainland 
liberalizes both its capital markets and its political system.     
  South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore are 
likely to adhere to an inflation target regime while letting their exchange rates “float.”  
Monetary credibility, however, must be established.  Central banks that cannot establish a  
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credible commitment to long-run price stability could adopt a currency board by linking 
to a credible foreign central bank, or, in Genberg’s view, could “agree to delegate their 
monetary policy to a supranational agency.”  The fundamental objective, however, would 
be monetary stability—not a rigid exchange rate peg as a means to make the transition to 
a common currency.  
 
Ending Financial Repression in China
5 
  As a key player in East Asia, China needs closer scrutiny.  In particular, one 
cannot simply assume that China will eventually move toward full convertibility and 
financial integration, without investigating the political economy of the transition from 
financial repression to capital freedom. 
China has made significant progress since 1978 in opening its economy to the 
outside world, but economic liberalization largely stopped at the gates of the financial 
sector.  Investment funds are channeled through state-owned banks to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), there are few investment alternatives, stock markets are dominated by 
SOEs, interest rates are set primarily by government fiat, the capital account is closed, 
and the exchange rate is tightly managed.   
 The consequences of China’s financial repression are easy to see: a sea of 
nonperforming loans; misallocation of capital, with overinvestment in the state sector and 
underinvestment in the private sector; politicization of investment decisions and 
widespread corruption; poor performance of stock markets even though economic growth 
has been robust; an undervalued real exchange rate; and stop-go monetary policy. 
 By suppressing two key macroeconomic prices—the interest rate and the 
exchange rate—and by failing to privatize financial markets and allow capital freedom, 
China’s leaders have given up flexibility and efficiency to ensure that the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) retains its grip on power.       
                                                 
5 This section and the following sections draw on James A. Dorn, “Ending Financial Repression in China,” 
Economic Development Bulletin No. 5 (January 26, 2006), Washington: Cato Institute.  
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  Controls on the free convertibility of currencies and on capital transactions violate 
private property rights and attenuate both economic and personal freedom.  Indeed, as F. 
A. Hayek warned in his classic book The Road to Serfdom (1944): 
 
The extent of the control over all life that economic 
control confers is nowhere better illustrated than in the field of 
foreign exchanges.  Nothing would at first seem to affect 
private life less than a state control of the dealings in foreign 
exchange, and most people will regard its introduction with 
complete indifference. Yet the experience of most Continental 
countries has taught thoughtful people to regard this step as the 
decisive advance on the path to totalitarianism and the 
suppression of individual liberty.
6     
      
  Once exchange and capital controls are imposed, they are difficult to remove.   
Government officials and special interest groups will profit at the expense of the public 
and use the force of law to plunder rather than protect property rights.  That has been the 
experience in China and was clearly the case in Europe after convertibility was 
suspended in 1931.  When convertibility was restored in 1958, Ludwig Erhard, vice-
chancellor and minister for economic affairs of the German Federal Republic, stated, “Of 
all the many possible forms which integration of the free world can take, free 
convertibility of currencies is the most fruitful.”
7       
Although China has made its currency convertible for current-account transactions, 
the capital account is still largely closed.  Moreover, residents are often discriminated 
against in favor of foreigners.  Making the transition to capital freedom in China would 
greatly increase economic and personal freedom, and help bring about political reform.  
                                                 
6  F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 92, n. 2. 
7 Ludwig Erhard, The Economics of Success (New York: Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 247.   
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The best way to achieve that goal is to stick to a policy of engagement rather than 
succumb to what Alan Greenspan has called “creeping protectionism.”
8  
Yasheng Huang, an economist at MIT, has shown that China’s financial market 
repression is substantial and got worse in the 1990s relative to the 1980s.  Using the 
World Bank’s “World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 2000” and other 
indicators, he finds “a systematic, pervasive, persistent bias in financial policies in favor 
of the least efficient firms in the Chinese economy—SOEs—at the expense of the most 
efficient firms,” namely, “China’s small, entrepreneurial and private enterprises.”
9  In 
response to a survey question, which assessed the extent of the “general financing 
constraint” (GFC) in selected countries as perceived by a sample of entrepreneurial firms 
in the nonstate sector in 1999–2000, the WBES found that 66.3 percent of the Chinese 
firms considered the GFC to be a “major obstacle.”  That proportion is the highest among 
Asian countries and exceeds the proportion in most transitional economies, including 
Russia (Figure 1).
10          
While the state sector produces less than one-third of industrial output value, it 
receives two-thirds of the commercial credit flowing through state-owned banks.  The 
lack of transparency and the politicization of the lending process have led to considerable 
waste as seen in the high proportion of nonperforming loans, estimated to be 25 percent 
or more.
11  Beijing has injected billions of dollars into the large state-owned banks and is 
slowly transforming them into joint-stock companies, but privatization is taboo.  
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) continues to peg the nominal exchange rate at a 
disequilibrium level, as indicated by the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
that now exceed $800 billion.  To prevent inflation, the PBC sells securities to drain off 
the RMB that is created when the bank buys foreign currencies.  That “sterilization” 
                                                 
8 Alan Greenspan, “”The Evolving U.S. Payments Imbalance and Its Impact on Europe and the Rest of the 
World,” Cato Journal 24, nos. 1–2 (Spring/Summer 2004), p. 11.  
9 Yasheng Huang, “Do Financing Biases Matter for the Chinese Economy?” Paper presented at the Cato 
Institute’s 23rd Annual Monetary Conference, Washington, D.C., November 3, 2005, p. 4.  
10 Ibid., Table 1, p. 19.  This table is based on the World Bank’s “World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) 2000.”  
11 Jonathan Anderson, “How to Think About China (Part 3): Which Way Out for the Banking System?”  
Asian Economic Perspectives, UBS Securities Asia Ltd., May 9, 2005, pp. 7–8.   
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process, however, becomes more difficult as the size of China’s current-account surplus 
grows. 
 






















Although China moved to a new exchange rate regime on July 21, 2005, in which 
the RMB is officially pegged to a basket of currencies, there has been relatively little 
movement in the RMB/dollar exchange rate and the daily trading band for the 
RMB/dollar rate remains fixed at 0.3 percent.  However, institutional changes are 
occurring to deepen the forex market and widen the range of choice for traders.
12   
China has the most restricted capital markets in Asia.  Portfolio investments are 
heavily controlled, as are most other capital-account transactions.  Changes are occurring, 
such as more lenient treatment of qualified foreign institutional investors, but at a snail’s 
                                                 
12 See Zhang Dingmin, “Forex Rate Forming Mechanism Reformed,” China Daily, January 4, 2006, p. 1, 
and Steve Johnson, “Traders Price in Surging Renminbi,” Financial Times, January 6, 2006.  
Source:  Yasheng Huang, “Do Financing Biases Matter? Table 1, p. 19, 




13  A ranking of Asian countries based on the UBS capital restrictiveness index 
indicates that China has a long way to go before it reaches the degree of capital freedom 




Capital and exchange controls clash with trade liberalization and are a heavy 
burden on China’s economy.  Of the top 10 global trading nations, only China has 
extensive capital controls.  In addition to restricting individual freedom, those controls 
impose high administrative costs, distort investment decisions, misallocate capital, and 
corrupt what would naturally be mutually beneficial free-market exchanges.
15 
                                                 
13 On recent reforms, see Fred Hu, “Capital Flows, Overheating, and the Nominal Exchange Rate Regime 
in China,” Cato Journal 25, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2005).    
14 The UBS capital restrictiveness index is based on a score of 10 (closed capital account) to 1 (open capital 
account).  In calculating this index, UBS takes account of “the number of legal impediments to capital 
account transactions” and “the size and variability of actual ex post capital flows.”  Jonathan Anderson, 
“How to Think About China (Part 6): Seven Ways China Won’t Change the World,” Asian Economic 
Perspectives, UBS Securities Asia Ltd., November 28, 2005, p. 23, n. 3. 
15 See Hu, p. 359. 
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Source: Jonathan Anderson, “How to Think about China (Part 6),” November 28, 
2005, p. 23, based on CEIC, IMF, and UBS estimates.  
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Trade liberalization must be accompanied by financial reform if China is to 
continue to develop.  It makes no sense for a capital-poor country like China to run 
persistent current-account surpluses that lead to net capital outflows—particularly, the 
massive accumulation of official foreign exchange reserves used primarily to purchase 
U.S. government securities.  Ending draconian capital controls and allowing widespread 
privatization would transform China’s socialist capital markets into genuine markets with 
real owners who would be responsible for their decisions and who would steer capital to 
its highest valued uses—as determined by free markets not state planners. 
  John Greenwood, chief economist at Invesco Asia, Ltd., has advocated that China 
abolish capital controls, float the RMB, and privatize state-owned banks and firms.  In his 
view, “If China’s capital markets and its industries were normalized (through 
deregulation, proper implementation of the rule of law, the encouragement of private 
markets, and extensive private ownership), then China’s balance of payments would no 
doubt undergo a major transformation.”
16      
The transition to capital freedom will be smoother, says Greenwood, if the central 
bank pursues a policy of monetary stability—that is, provides a framework for long-run 
price stability.  To do so, however, requires that the PBC let market demand and supply 
determine the equilibrium value of the exchange rate and focus primarily on controlling 
domestic money and credit growth, which means interest rates must also be liberalized.  
On the other hand, “under a fixed nominal rate framework, external capital controls are 
much more likely to be maintained and the adjustments to the trade and current account 
are therefore much less likely to occur.”
17      
To those who argue that capital account liberalization would destabilize China, just 
as it did to other emerging market countries during the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, 
Greenwood argues that the root cause of that crisis was not capital freedom but rather the 
pegged exchange rate system combined with excessive growth of money and credit 
beginning as early as 1993.  “The general lesson is that to control money and credit 
                                                 
16 John Greenwood, “The Impact of China’s WTO Accession on Capital Freedom,” Cato Journal, 21, no. 1 
(Spring/Summer 2001), p. 93. 
17 Ibid., pp. 93–94.  
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growth within reasonable ranges that are compatible with low inflation in the longer run, 
the external value of the currency must be free to adjust—especially upwards.”
18   
If China chooses to keep the RMB/dollar rate undervalued and maintains capital 
controls, it will continue to experience stop-go monetary policy as the domestic money 
supply responds to the balance of payments and the PBC attempts to sterilize capital 
inflows.  This schizophrenic monetary policy—trying to use monetary policy to manage 
both the exchange rate and the price level—is untenable in the long run if China wants to 
become a world-class financial center.  
 
The Question of Sequencing  
There has been much discussion regarding how China should sequence its 
economic reforms and make the transition to capital freedom.  It is clear that opening 
capital markets without reforming state-owned banks and without maintaining monetary 
stability could lead to substantial capital flight and exacerbate the problem of 
nonperforming loans.  Likewise, there must be an effective legal system to protect newly 
acquired private property rights.  
In a recent interview, Zhou Xiaochuan, the head of the PBC, emphasized that China 
is committed to create an institutional framework for a more flexible exchange rate 
regime “based on market demand and supply,” and “gradually realize RMB convertibility 
. . . by lifting the restrictions on cross-border capital movements in a selective and step-
by-step manner.”  In sequencing the financial sector reforms, the first priority is to put the 
banking system on a sound footing by recapitalizing the large state-owned banks and 
turning them into joint-stock companies with the participation of foreign strategic 
investors.  Further progress must also be achieved in widening the scope of foreign 
exchange transactions, including liberalizing the capital account.  Zhou recognizes that 
institutional change cannot occur overnight because “people need some time to learn and 
adapt to change.”  A new “mindset” must be developed.   Moreover, he understands that 
                                                 
18 John Greenwood, “The Real Issues in Asia,” Cato Journal 20, no. 2 (Fall 2000), p. 146.   
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China “cannot wait to start reforming the exchange rate regime until all banking reform 
measures have been completed.”
19  Reform measures must occur along a broad front.  
 
Policy Recommendations 
Economic development—properly understood as “an increase in the range of 
effective alternatives open to people”
20—requires the protection of both economic and 
other liberties.  Without secure private property rights and economic freedom, personal 
freedom will suffer.  Economic liberalization, privatization, and free-market competition 
are the only effective means to expand individual choices and, hence, to develop.  
The United States and China need to continue the policy of engagement and 
recognize that it is more important to focus on the issue of capital freedom than on the 
narrow question of the proper exchange rate.  China should continue to liberalize its 
exchange rate regime, open its capital markets, allow full convertibility of the RMB, 
liberalize interest rates, and use domestic monetary policy to achieve long-run price 
stability.  Most important, China needs to privatize its stock markets, its banks, and its 
firms.  
Many of those recommendations have already been accepted in principle as long-
run policy goals.  Indeed, the PBC’s Monetary Policy Committee, at its third quarterly 
meeting in 2005, concluded: 
•  “The market itself should be allowed to play its role in economic restructuring.” 
•  “Market-based interest rate reform policies should be continuously carried out.” 
•  “Measures should be taken to further improve the managed floating exchange rate 
regime and maintain the exchange rate …at an adaptive and equilibrium level.” 
                                                 
19 “Governor Zhou Xiaochuan Speaks on Issues Related to the Reform of the Exchange Rate Regime,” 
People’s Bank of China News, September 10, 2005, pp. 1–2, 13.  Available at 
www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6400&id=572.  
20 Peter Bauer, Economic Analysis and Policy in Underdeveloped Countries (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1957), p. 113.   
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•  “Efforts should be made to advance financial reform” and “to enhance the 
effectiveness of monetary policy transmission.”
21 
Those pro-market policy recommendations are a positive sign and a clear signal 
that China’s top policymakers are aware of what needs to be done to improve the 
financial architecture.   
                                                 
21 “Monetary Policy Committee of the PBC Held the 3rd Quarterly Meeting of 2005,” People’s Bank of 
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At first, I point out some backgrounds for this paper. Firstly, we learnt some lessons 
from the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997. Among them, it is very important to experience 
that official and de facto dollar peg system had adverse effects on macroeconomy and 
currencies in the region. Secondly, East Asian countries have strong economic 
relationships with intra-regional countries and European countries as well as the United 
States in terms of merchant and service trades and cross-boarder capital transactions 
including FDI, portfolio investments and bank loans. Also production network have been 
established in East Asian region. Trade volumes of intermediate goods as well as final 
goods have been increasing among East Asian countries. Lastly, under a variety of 
exchange rate systems in East Asia, the US dollar depreciation makes inter-regional 
exchange rates unstable and misaligned. 
This paper pointed out two developments in terms of both exchange rate 
coordination and greater financial integration in East Asia. One development is that the 
increased trade integration among economies in the region has led to calls for 
coordination of exchange rate policies lest competitive depreciations lead to artificial 
distortions in competitiveness, disruptions of trade, and dislocation of production. The 
other development is that it is recognized that international capital flows can bring 
substantial benefits and this ambiguous attitude towards international capital flow have 
been to encourage financial integration within the region. This paper takes these two 
developments towards greater financial integration on the one hand and proposal for 
exchange rate coordination on the other. 
This paper gives us some important points of investigation about issues related with 
exchange rate policy coordination in East Asia. Firstly, this paper considers the proposals 
for exchange rate policy coordination that have focused on some form of common 
exchange rate peg. It emphasizes the difference between pegs that link the currencies to 
an external anchor and those that are based on an internal unit of account. It set out their 
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implication for the conduct of monetary policy in the countries that join the exchange rate 
arrangement. 
Secondly, this paper proposes an alternative Asian path towards monetary stability 
and monetary unification via regional monetary policy coordination, that is coordination 
in introducing and conducting inflation targeting in a situation of free mobility of capital. 
The Asian approach should be to adopt inflation targeting without commitment towards 
maintaining a particular exchange rate level. 
Thirdly, this paper discusses “currency map” of East Asia in a ten to twenty 
horizon, assuming the RMB will be convertible. It forecasts that Japan and China will 
adopt independent monetary policies and floating exchange rates. Hong Kong and 
Taiwan will share the same currency with the Mainland, China. The author showed two 
scenarios for South East Asian countries. One is that retaining independence of monetary 
policy, that is, inflation targeting with flexible or managed floating exchange rate system. 
The other is that establishing of a common central bank (South East Asian Monetary 
Authority) and introducing a common currency (South East Asian Monetary Unit). 
I have three comments on the above-mentioned points in this paper. 
The first comment is related with a common currency basket arrangement for East 
Asia. It includes not only fixing home currency to the common currency basket but also 
managed floating with reference to a common currency basket. East Asian currencies 
should be stabilized against the intra-regional currencies, the US dollar and the euro 
because East Asian economies have strong relationships with intra-regional countries, the 
United States, and European countries in terms of price competitiveness, trade and 
current accounts, and capital flows. It is represented by an effective exchange rate when 
we focus on trade account. 
Firstly, they can achieve the stabilization for intra-regional exchange rates by 
targeting their currencies towards a common currency basket that is composed of regional 
currencies. Its problem is how stable the common currency basket is. Secondly, the can 
achieve the stabilization for both intra-regional exchange rates and the outside currencies 
by targeting their currencies towards a common currency basket is composed of the G3  
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currencies (or G2 currencies for Japan). Its problem is related with inclusion or exclusion 
of the Japanese yen. 
I show one example of a common currency basket for East Asia. Ogawa and 
Shimizu (2005) propose creation of an Asian Monetary Unit (AMU) and AMU Deviation 
Indicators
1 for East Asian currencies in order to contribute to coordinated exchange rate 
policies in East Asia. AMU: a weighted average of ASEAN10+3. Shares of trade 
volumes and GDP measured at PPP are used to calculate the weights. Figure 1 shows that 
a value of the AMU in terms of a currency basket that is composed of the US dollar and 
the euro is relatively stable. However, Figure 2 shows that intra-regional exchange rates 
are fluctuating widely. Especially, the AMU Deviation Indicator of the Korea won is 
overvalued by 15% compared with its benchmark rate while the AMU Deviation 
Indicator of the Philippine peso is undervalued by 18% compared with its benchmark 
rate. Thus, the value of the AMU in terms of a currency basket of the US dollar and the 
euro is stable. On one hand, some East Asian currencies are overvalued and undervalued. 
The second comment is related with the Asian approach. The Asian approach, that 
is a monetary cooperation coordination approach, is in part good for East Asian region. 
The monetary policy coordination approach can be taken in a form of a common inflation 
targeting to stabilize intra-regional exchange rates in the long run or in terms of the 
purchasing power parity. However, it cannot stabilize the intra-regional exchange rates in 
the short-run. Accordingly, an exchange rate band or managed floating exchange rate 
system with reference to a common currency basket should be accompanied with the 
monetary policy coordination in order to prevent from volatility and misalignment of the 
intra-regional exchange rates. 
The last comment is related with the “currency map.” As for introducing a common 
currency into ASEAN, an anchor currency should be included into a common currency 
basket and a common currency in order that they should have a stable value and a 
confidence. Are there any ASEAN currencies as an anchor currency? The Japanese yen 
should be included into a common currency basket or a common currency as an anchor 
                                                 




currency in the future although there are difficulties in Japan’s joining an East Asian 
common currency area for the moment because of different stages of economic 
developments and asymmetric shocks among East Asian countries and Japan. Also the 
RMB should be included into a common currency basket or a common currency in order 
that China should share a common currency system with the rest of East Asia and 
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